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Abstract
We  identify  four  different  minimal  versions  of  the  indispensability  argument,  falling  under  four 
difference varieties: an epistemic argument for semantic realism, an epistemic argument for platonism, and 
a  non-epistemic  version  of  both.  We  argue  that  most  current  formulations  of  the  argument  can  be 
reconstructed  by  building  upon  the  suggested  minimal  versions.  Part  of  our  discussion  relies  on  a 
clarification of the notion of (in)dispensability as relational in character. We then present some substantive 
consequences of our inquiry for the philosophical significance of the indispensability argument, the most 
relevant of which being that both naturalism and confirmational holism can be dispensed with, contrary to 
what is held by many.
1. Introduction
The recent debate on the indispensability argument (henceforth, IA) in the philosophy 
of mathematics features an impressive number of versions of the argument, all somehow 
pointing back to what is referred to as “the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument”, 
that is to Quine’s several scattered remarks on the subject and to Putnam’s [1971] first 
proper formulation of a version of IA. It is thus legitimate to wonder whether all (or, at 
least, most of) the versions available on the market can be really traced back to some 
minimal shared structure.
After rehearsing the most common stances towards IA, the main aim of this paper is to 
offer  four  minimal  versions  of  IA,  minimal  in  so  far  as  they  feature,  according  to 
classifications that will be explained below, the fewest or least controversial premises 
needed to gain the desired conclusion(s). We will submit that different formulations of IA 
on the market, related to the common stances to be discussed, could be retrieved from the 
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minimal arguments to be offered1.
 Despite its methodological character, the following inquiry will have as a substantive 
conclusion  that  in  order  to  obtain  the  desired  conclusions  some  commonly  required 
assumptions—namely, confirmational holism and naturalism—will prove dispensable. 
Since  it  is  not  our  intention  in  this  occasion  to  take  a  stance  in  the  debate  on 
indispensability, many of the criticisms or defences of IA will not be discussed.
The structure of the paper is as follows. § 2 introduces the issue by reference to the 
debate  by  considering  some  representative  versions  of  the  argument.  §  3  offers  a 
taxonomy of four minimal versions of IA. § 4 focuses on the notion of (in)dispensability. 
§ 5 considers in details which assumptions and notions are really needed if one wishes to 
endorse the minimal arguments. § 6 indicates how the representative versions considered 
in § 2 can be retrieved from the minimal arguments. § 7 offers concluding remarks on the 
bearing of the present inquiries for the philosophical significance of IA.
2. The Indispensability Argument: four common stances
A few expository remarks will help us to single out four common stances concerning 
the structure and significance of IA that we take as representative of the ongoing 
debate.
Putnam  [1971]’s  well-known  passage  is  commonly  assumed  as  the  reference 
formulation:
So far I have been developing an argument for realism roughly along the following 
lines:  quantification  over  mathematical  entities  is  indispensable  for  science,  both 
formal and physical, therefore we should accept such quantification; but this commits 
us to accepting the existence of the mathematical entities in question. This type of 
argument stems, of course, from Quine... [Putnam 1971, p. 347].
Putnam  wavers,  at  different  places,  between  considering  the  conclusion  of  the 
1 This paper builds on the analysis of indispensability arguments presented in Panza, Sereni [2013], chs. 
6-7;  some of its conclusions,  together with the four versions of the minimal indispensability argument 
discussed in §3, have thus been anticipated in that work.
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argument to be a form of platonism, or rather a conclusion in favour of mathematical 
realism2.  For our present purpose, it  suffices that the two theses are acknowledged as 
distinct and both plausible: by platonism we mean, the thesis that there exist objects of a 
certain sort, namely such that our current mathematical theories can be taken to be about 
them, in short that there exist mathematical objects3; by mathematical realism we mean a 
particular form of semantic realism, i.e. the thesis that the statements encompassed by our 
current mathematical theories, or better its theorems or consequences,  are true (without 
specific commitment to what makes them true)4.
Puntnam’s own views apart, his quotation above is commonly seen as a paradigmatic 
example of an argument for platonism. Prima facie, the Putnam’s version of the argument 
appeals only two notions,  indispensability and  quantification.  However,  many believe 
that beside these notions, IA relies on some additional theses of Quinean provenance: 
confirmational holism and naturalism. The most debated formulation of IA that is faithful 
to this conception has been advanced by Mark Colyvan's5: 
i) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only those entities that are indispensable to our  
best scientific theories;
ii) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories;
------------------------------
iii) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities
2 Cf. Liggins [2008] for a reconstruction.
3 If  fact,  we believe that  other possible (and possibly more plausible)  forms of platonism could be 
fashioned, and that the thesis just mentioned should then be more correctly called ‘ontological platonism’. 
However,  insofar  as  it  is  not  part  of  our  present  aims  to  argue  for  such  distinction,  we  avoid  this  
specification and call it ‘platonism’ tout court.  Nothing in this thesis mandates that mathematical objects 
are abstract, and indeed, though this is generally (or at least, often) admitted, IA can support the thesis 
without going into details about the nature of mathematical objects.
4  Semantic realism as conceived here is distinct from what Michael Dummett called ‘realism’ (see e.g.  
Dummett [1978]): the latter is a thesis about statements possessing an objective, mind-independent truth-
value, whereas the former is the claim that the relevant statements are true (possibly in a mind-independent 
way, but not necessarily).
5Colyvan [2001, p. 11]. Cf. also Resnik [1995, p. 430].
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According  to  Colyvan,  “the  crucial  first  premise  follows  from  the  doctrines  of 
naturalism and  holism”6.  Naturalism would  be  required  in  order  to  justify  the  only-
direction  of  the  implication,  which,  as  Colyvan  himself  acknowledge7,  is,  in  fact, 
redundant  for  drawing  the  conclusion,  and  confirmational  holism  to  justify  the  all-
direction. Whether this is so hinges on how the notions involved are defined.
So far, we are confronted with representatives of two different stances on IA. On the 
one hand, Putnam is concerned with logico-syntactical features of scientific theories and 
their  expressive  power:  what  is  at  stake  is  whether  some  particular  vocabulary  is 
necessary in order to  state some given scientific laws8.  On the other hand, Colyvan’s 
formulation widens the scope by taking into account general concerns in the philosophy 
of science, especially as regards the relation between philosophy and science and the way 
in which empirical evidence is meant to confirm scientific theories.
There is yet a third stance on IA. Hartry Field first suggested that a particular version 
of IA involves indispensability “for explanations” [1989, p. 14]: if we have a theory that 
we take to be our best explanation of a given set of (arguably empirical) phenomena, and 
this theory includes some statements to the extent that certain (sorts of) objects exist, then 
we “have  a  strong reason to  believe”  (ibid.,  p.  15)  in  the  truth of  the  statements  in 
question,  and  consequently  (pending  a  clarification  of  the  ontological  import  of 
existential statements) in the existence of the relevant (sorts of) objects. This requires that 
inference to the best explanation (IBE) is considered a reliable principle. This third stance 
on IA thus equates (faithful to some of Quine’s remarks, as well as to Putnam’s overall 
picture) arguments for mathematical (ontological) realism and arguments for scientific 
realism about unobservable entities, where IBE is often appealed to. As a result of the 
recent  vast  debate  on  explanation,  and  mathematical  explanation  in  particular9,  Alan 
6 Colyvan [2001, p. 12].
7 Cf. Colyvan [2001, p. 12]: “[...]  I should point out that the frst premise, as I've stated it, is a little  
stronger than required. In order to gain the given conclusion all that is really required in the frst premise is 
the ‘all,’ not the ‘all and only, ’ I include the ‘all and only, ’ however, for the sake of completeness and also 
to help highlight the important role naturalism plays in questions about ontology, since it is naturalism that  
counsels us to look to science and nowhere else for answers to ontological questions”. 
8 Cf. §§ V to VIII of Putnam [1971].
9 Cf. Hafner, Mancosu [2005], Baker [2005, 2009], Mancosu [2008]
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Baker [2009, p. 613] has claimed that “for the purposes of establishing platonism […] it  
needs to be shown that reference to mathematical objects sometimes plays an explanatory 
role  in  science”.  He  has  thus  offered  the  following  “Enhanced  Indispensability 
Argument” (ibid.):
i) We ought rationally to believe in the existence of any entity which plays an indispensable explanatory 
role in our best scientific theories;
ii) Mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in science;
------------------------------
iii) Hence, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of to mathematical objects.
Finally, we have a fourth stance, represented by arguments that build on pragmatic 
considerations,  or  generally  considerations  concerned  with  scientific  practice  and  its 
needs. The most representative argument in this case has been presented by Resnik [1995, 
pp. 169-171; 1997, pp. 46-7]10:
i) In stating its laws and conducting its derivations science assumes the existence of many mathematical 
objects and the truth of much mathematics. 
ii) These assumptions are indispensable to the pursuit of science;  moreover,  many of the important 
conclusions  drawn from and  within  science  could  not  be  drawn  without  taking  mathematical  
claims to be true. 
------------------------------ 
iii) So we are justified in drawing conclusions from and within science only if we are justified in taking 
the mathematics used in science to be true. 
iv) We are justified in doing science. 
v) The only way we know of doing science involves drawing conclusions from and within it. 
------------------------------
vi) So, we are justified in taking that mathematics to be true. 
------------------------------ 
10 The argument is presented in slightly different terms in the two occasions. We are here using the one  
in Resnik [1995].
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(vii) So, mathematics is true. 
Setting apart  any consideration about the validity of this version of IA, let  us just 
notice that  it  differs from the previous versions to the extent  that,  as Resnik himself 
claims,  it  does  not  depend on the claim that  “the  evidence for science (one body of 
statements)  is  also  evidence  for  its  mathematical  components  (another  body  of 
statements)”, but merely requires that “the justification for doing science (one act) also 
justifies our accepting as true such mathematics as science uses (another act)”11.
More recently, Azzouni [2009] has offered a reading of IA that is also based, though in 
rather different terms, on pragmatic considerations. More specifically, in a vein similar to 
ours (cf. footnote 17 below), Azzouni offers the following enthymematic “blueprint” for 
IA:
Premise:  Certain  statements  that  quantify  over  mathematical  entities  are  indispensable  to 
science. 
Conclusion: Those statements are true. 
as  underlying  a  family  of  arguments  usually  referred  to  as  ‘Quine-Putnam 
indispensability argument’. He then proposes to expand on this blueprint in order 
to offer what he labels the ‘Assertoric-use QP’, a version of IA based on the fact 
that what he calls the ‘assertoric use’ of mathematical statements is indispensable 
to science, and that this use commits speakers to the truth of the statements in 
question. We will consider Azzouni’s proposal, together with what we take to be 
a plausible reconstruction of his Assertoric-use QP, in more details below in §6.
For the time being, it  is important to acknowledge that four major  stances emerge 
when looking at the different versions of IA actually on the market, hinging respectively 
on logico-syntactic considerations related to expressive power (as in Putnam), on general 
views on science and confirmation (as in Colyvan), on the notion of explanation (as in 
Baker), and on features of scientific practice (as in Resnik or Azzouni). It is relevant to 
emphasize this point, since if minimal versions of IA are to be offered, they should at 
11 Resnik [1995, p. 171].
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least  to  be  compatible  with  these  common stances.  It  is  not  our  intention to  offer  a 
minimal formulation corresponding to each of these representative arguments. However, 
we will discuss to which extent and how it is possible, from the minimal versions to be 
offered, to retrieve something very close to them, or at least as close as to fit with the 
same stances. 
3. The Minimal Indispensability Argument(s)
Since our aim is to establish, with respect to available versions of IA, what a minimal 
argument needs retain, and what it can let go, we better start by considering the features 
of Colyvan’s argument, which appears to be the most theoretically loaded version among 
the ones reviewed above. Here are some of its essential features. Firstly and obviously, it 
appeals to some notion of indispensability. Secondly, it is an argument for platonism, and 
not just for semantic realism. Thirdly, it is an argument stated in epistemic terms on two 
scores:  on  the  one  side,  its  premises  and conclusions  deal  with  what  we “ought  to” 
believe, or what entities we “ought to” be ontologically committed to; on the other side, it 
deals with the notion of justification, since ‘best’, in “best scientific theories”, should be 
understood  as  ‘best  justified’12.  Fourthly,  it  appeals  to  the  notion  of  ontological 
commitment; here, as in most cases, Quine’s criterion ([QC]) is the relevant one 13. Fifthly, 
it is claimed to rely,  for the justification of its first premise, on naturalism, and, sixthly 
and finally, on confirmational holism.
Are all of these features essential in order to obtain a version of IA? Obviously, any 
12 Though Colyvan does not explicitly equate ‘best’ with ‘best justified’, the list of scientific virtues he 
considers in Colyvan [2001, pp. 78-9] for a scientific theory to count as good—among which are empirical  
adequacy,  consistency,  simplicity  and  parsimony,  unificatory  and  explanatory  power,  boldness  and 
fruitfulness, and formal elegance—makes clear that he (like other supporters of IA) has much more in mind 
than simply currently accepted theories. Notice, in passing, that the ‘ought to’, as opposed to the ‘best 
justified’, has both a permissive and a prescriptive component. We will not put much weight on the latter.
13 Cf.  Colyvan [2001,  pp.  22-24]  for  some qualifications.  Briefly,  [QC]  states  that  the  ontological 
commitment of  a  theory  T is  given  by the objects  that  must  be counted in  the range of  the objectual  
quantifiers  in  the  existential  theorems of  (the  canonical  reformulation  of)  T.  [QC] plays  in  Colyvan’s 
argument the same role that quantification plays in Putnam’s argument. Cf. Quine [1948].
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such  version  needs  retain  the  first  feature:  it  requires  appeal  to  some  notion  of 
indispensability. But things are different with the other features. 
Clearly, some criterion is needed for selecting those scientific theories to which the 
argument is meant to apply. One can, however, either appeal here to epistemic notions or 
to non-epistemic notions,  such as truth. We thus get a first broad distinction between 
arguments stated in epistemic or in non-epistemic terms.
 Further, as already remarked, IA can be an argument for mathematical realism, rather 
than platonism, and we need to keep the two possibilities apart.
We thus  end up with  four  possible  varieties  of  IA:  as  an  epistemic  argument  for 
mathematical realism, as an epistemic argument for platonism, and, respectively,  as a 
non-epistemic variety of each.
Let us begin with epistemic versions of IA for mathematical realism. As regards the 
selection  criterion  for  theories,  the  most  natural  choice  is  for  a  criterion  based  on 
justification14.  Justification,  however,  comes  in  many forms.  For  the  time  being,  our 
appeal to it will be independent of any particular theory of justification. We could even 
not  assume that justification  for a  theory is  justification  in  believing the theory true: 
having justification for a scientific theory could be understood as simply having reasons, 
even only pragmatic ones, for adopting a scientific theory in ordinary scientific practice
—e.g.  because  it  is  instrumentally  helpful,  or  predictively  accurate,  or  the  like.  This 
would lead to an argument along the following lines: we have a justification for some 
scientific  theories;  among  them,  some are  such  that  some  mathematical  theories  are 
indispensable to them; we have a justification for these scientific theories only if we a 
have  a  justification  for  the  mathematical  theories  that  are  indispensable  to  them; 
therefore, we have a justification for the mathematical theories indispensable to these 
scientific theories.
No mention  of  truth  is  made  here.  This  is  prima facie consistent  with  Colyvan’s 
argument, where no mention of truth is made either. Admittedly, however, in the debate 
14 Notice that a weaker notion, like that of acceptance of a scientific theory, modelled e.g. on the lines  
suggested by Van Fraassen [1980], will not be strong enough to deliver the required mathematical realist or  
platonist  conclusion.  We  will  consider  later  the  possibility  of  appealing  merely  to  the  notion  of 
confirmation rather than that of justification.
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on IA—and in Colyvan’s discussion too—justification is understood as justification for 
the  truth  of  a  theory.  We  can,  then,  specify  the  argument  accordingly,  and  get  the 
following version of IA:
Realism, epistemic [RE]
i) We are justified in believing some scientific theories to be true;
[We are justified in believing T is true]
ii) Among them, some are such that some mathematical theories are indispensable to them;
[M is indispensable to T]
iii) We are justified in believing true these scientific theories only if we are justified in believing  
true the mathematical theories that are indispensable to them;
[We are justified in believing T true only if we are justified in believing M true]
[RE]------------------------------
iv)  We are justified in believing true the mathematical theories indispensable to these scientific theories.
[We are justified in believing M true]
In  what  follows,  we  will  take  [RE]  as  the  reference  formulation  for  a  minimal 
epistemic version of IA for semantic realism. [RE] is nothing but a specification of the 
more general argument sketched above, in which justification need not be justification for 
truth. Should we rest content with that more general argument, however, we could hardly 
obtain an argument for mathematical realism, for we would lack, unless further premises 
are added, any link between the justification of a theory and its truth (this is why we do  
not consider that version of the argument as one of our minimal versions of IA).
Since  no  mention  of  mathematical  objects  is  made  in  [RE],  [QC]—as  any  other 
alternative  criterion—is  not  needed  in  the  formulation  nor  in  the  justification  of  its 
premises. [RE] is neutral as to whether it is the existence of mathematical objects that 
makes the relevant mathematical theories true. [RE] would be a desirable version of IA 
for all those who believe in the objectivity and truth of mathematics, but would not by 
this fact alone qualify themselves as platonists15.
15 Putnam’s  [1967]  equivalent  descriptions,  or  Hellman’s  [1989]  modal  structuralism are two well-
known candidates. [RE] seems also to respect the basic ideas underlying the criticisms that Pincock [2004], 
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Despite  this,  from  [RE],  an  epistemic  version  of  IA for  platonism  can  be  easily 
obtained  by  adding  a  premise  introducing  some  appropriate  criterion  of  ontological 
commitment:
Platonism, epistemic [PE]
i)    We are justified in believing some scientific theories to be true;
[We are justified in believing T is true]
ii) Among them, some are such that some mathematical theories are indispensable to them;
[M is indispensable to T]
iii) We are justified in believing true these scientific theories only if we are justified in believing true the  
mathematical theories that are indispensable to them;
[We are justified in believing T true only if we are justified in believing M true]
iv)  We are justified in believing true a mathematical theory only if we are justified in believing the  
objects it is about to exist;
[We are justified in believing M true only if we are justified in believing the objects it is 
about to exist]
[PE]------------------------------
v) We are justified in believing the objects which the indispensable mathematical theories are about  
to exist
[We are justified in believing the objects M is abOut to exist]
Indispensability arguments are most of the time cast in epistemic terms. As Colyvan 
himself  stresses,  this  epistemic  character  is  due  to  a  conception  of  ontology  as  a 
prescriptive and normative discipline: it tells us what we ought to believe to exist, or, in 
other  terms,  what  we are justified in  believing to  exist16.  However,  one might  rather 
conceive  of  ontology  as  a  descriptive  discipline,  and  ask  for  arguments  whose 
conclusions tell us that certain (sorts of) objects do exist, not just that we are justified in 
believing them to exist. Let us then formulate the arguments in a non-epistemic fashion:
Realism, non-epistemic [RnE]
Azzouni [2004] and Paseau [2007] move against the standard platonist versions of IA.
16 Cf. Colyvan [2001], p.11. Cf. also fn. 8 above.
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i)     There are true scientific theories;
[T is true]
ii)  Among them, some are such that some mathematical theories are indispensable to them;
[M is indispensable to T]
iii)  These scientific theories are true only if their indispensable mathematical theories are themselves 
true;
[T is true only if M is true]
[RnE]------------------------------
iv)  The mathematical theories indispensable to these scientific theories are true17
[M is true]
Platonism, non-epistemic [PnE]
i)     There are true scientific theories;
[T is true]
ii)  Among them, some are such that some mathematical theories are indispensable to them;
[M is indispensable to T]
iii)  These scientific theories are true only if their indispensable mathematical theories are themselves 
true;
[T is true only if M is true]
iv)  A mathematical theory is true only if the objects it is about exist;
[M is true only if the objects M is about exist]
[PnE]------------------------------
v)  The objects which the indispensable mathematical theories are about exist
[The objects M is about exist]
All these four minimal versions of IA are schematic, in more than one sense. First of 
all, ‘T’ and ‘M’, in the bracketed version of each premise, can be substituted, respectively, 
with  particular  scientific  and  mathematical  theories.  Furthermore,  the  meaning  of 
‘indispensable’, ‘justification’, ‘true’ in all four arguments can be specified in different 
ways, so as to get strictly different arguments according to which specification is chosen. 
17 Those who believe the first premise to be too harsh can still accept a weaker formulation in which that  
premise is discharged and the conclusion is conditional in form, i.e. ‘If there are true theories, then ...’. 
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What is relevant is that the notions of justification and truth, however specified, must be 
such that  justification in believing a theory true, and truth itself,  are preserved under 
indispensability, however the latter is specified on its turn. In arguments for platonism, 
moreover, premise (iv) can be further qualified according to any preferred specification of 
the intuitive notion of aboutness (in Quinean terms, that premise would be specified, 
according to [QC], by reference to quantifiers and their domain)18.
Prima facie, no such theses as naturalism, confirmational holism (or other) seem to be 
explicitly  involved in  the minimal  arguments.  But  it  remains  open  whether  these (or 
other) theses are required, even as background assumptions, for the soundness of these 
arguments; this must be discussed in more details, especially if the relations between the 
minimal versions and the four representative versions of IA presented in the § 2 must be 
spelled out. We will  first pause to discuss the notion of (in)dispensability in the next 
section,  and then  consider  which  assumptions  and notions  are  really  involved in  the 
minimal  arguments.  The  following  discussion  concerning  both  (in)dispensability  and 
other  relevant  notions  will  also  help  clarifying  how  several  versions  of  IA can  be 
retrieved from our suggested minimal versions (cf. §6 below).
4. The relational character of (in)dispensability
Despite its obvious relevance for IA, the notion of (in)dispensability has undergone 
little specific analysis in the debate. What is exactly taken to be indispensable? And to 
what? And what does it mean to be indispensable? 
As regards the first question, different aspects or ingredients of mathematics can and 
are  taken  into  account  in  formulations  of  IA:  the  quantification  over  mathematical 
“entities” or (putative) “objects” (like in Putnam [1971]); mathematical entities or objects 
themselves, like in Colyvan [2011], p. 11, or Baker [2005] or many others; the apparent 
18 Also Azzouni’s blueprint reported in §2 above could be thought to be schematic. However, this is so 
in a different sense. Whereas our arguments are schematic in that they can be turned into strictly different  
versions of IA by further specifying some of the notions involved, Azzouni’s blueprint is rather a matrix 
from which  explicit  and  logically  valid  versions  of  IA can  be  obtained  through the  addition  of  other  
assumptions.
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reference to such entities or objects, like in Colyvan [2011], p. 7; the assumption of the 
truth  of  some  mathematical  statements  (namely,  statements  involving  mathematical 
vocabulary),  like  in  Resnik  [1995],  pp.  169-171;  [1997],  pp.  46-48;  mathematical 
vocabulary (which we take to  be what  is  often implicitly intended when authors use 
‘apparent reference’, like in Colyvan [2011], p. 16; some appropriate use of mathematical 
statements, like in Azzouni [2009]; or finally, mathematical theories. 
It is possible to maintain that there are significant differences stemming from these 
allegedly  alternative  choices.  Those  who  believe  this  should  also  consider  minimal 
schematic versions of AI in which it is not specified what is taken to be indispensable. We 
will  not dwell  here on this  matter,  as well  as on other possible  parameters that fully 
schematic  version  of  IA  can  involve  (for  instance,  parameters  specifying  whether 
indispensability  is  constrained  by  certain  goals  we  want  our  scientific  theories  to 
achieve), since we consider this at length elsewhere (cf. Panza, Sereni [forthcoming]). 
Here, we rather assume that there is a common idea underlying all the mentioned options 
regarding what is to be taken as indispensable, namely that the relevant scientific theories 
have an essential recourse to a vocabulary fixed by some mathematical theories, and then 
to the notions that this vocabulary is supposed to convey. As far as what is taken to be 
indispensable is some appropriate use of mathematical statements, we take it that what is 
relevant is that of the statements of a mathematical theory, or statements involving the 
mathematical vocabulary fixed by this theory, it is possible to make this appropriate use
—while (appropriately) using (the statements of) a scientific theory. So also this option 
seems to reduce,  with this  proviso,  to  the option according to  which it  is  the use of 
theories  to  be  indispensable  (to  other  theories;  see  below  the  answer  to  the  second 
question).19 Moreover, it seems to us that by literally accepting the option that what is 
indispensable are mathematical entities or objects themselves, one is open to an obvious 
risk of circularity (unless one is ready to concede that these entities or objects could be 
indispensable  as  such without  existing).  Here,  thus,  we will  rest  content  with  taking 
19 A different issue is whether an argument based on the indispensability of the use of theories can be 
retrieved from arguments based on the indispensability of theories tout court: we will come back to this in 
§6.
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mathematical theories, as what is said to be indispensable in IA, though leaving open the 
possibility of understanding this, when more details are given, in different ways.
Parallel considerations also apply to the second question. We will thus rest content 
with taking other theories, typically scientific ones, to be that for which mathematical 
theories are said to be indispensable in IA, although we leave open, again, the possibility 
of understanding this, when more details are given, in different ways20.
The third question seems to us much more relevant. Let us focus on that, then. As will 
be clear, this will also help explain how some common versions of IA can be retrieved 
from the minimal versions through appropriate specifications of this notion.
What does it really mean that a theory is indispensable to another? Let T be a scientific 
theory, and M a mathematical theory employed in the formulation of T.  Let us call, for 
short, a statement employing the vocabulary of a theory  M an ‘M-loaded statement’. It 
seems to us obvious to take M to be indispensable to T if it is not possible to obtain from T 
a theory T’, equivalent to T according to some specified equivalence relation, in which M-
loaded statements do not occur. But, then, given any version of IA, in order to specify the 
indispensability condition involved in it one has to choose the appropriate equivalence 
relation according to which T’ is to be taken as equivalent to T. In most cases, it seems to 
be tacitly admitted that the relevant equivalence relation is such that if T’ is equivalent to 
T according  to  it,  then  T’ preserves  the  descriptive  and  predictive  power  of  T.  This 
suggests  taking  this  relation  to  be  something  like  the  relation  of  having  the  same 
empirical adequacy, or that of having the same observational consequences. Still, other 
choices could be pertinent.
Making this choice will not be enough, however, since it is also important to make 
sure  that  the  equivalence  between  T and  T’  is  not  obtained  by  merely  formal 
gerrymandering.  This  requirement  captures  Field’s  suggestion  that  T’  has  to  be 
“reasonably attractive” [1980, p. 8], or Colyvan’s suggestion that it must be “preferable” 
to  T [2001, p. 77]. Craig’s Theorem is, for example, a well-known example of a purely 
20 Whether we should consider a mathematical theory  M indispensable to a theory  T when only some 
parts of M are as a matter of fact used for the formulation of T depends, among other things, on whether the 
employed part  of  M is  such that  it  can  be  considered  an  independent  (sub-)theory  of  M.  This  is  what 
Peressini [1997] labels ‘the problem of the unit of indispensability’.
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formal method for obtaining from any (recursively enumerable theory) theory T involving 
M-loaded statements a (recursively axiomatizable theory) theory T’ that involves no such 
statement and has the same observational content21.
Attractiveness and preferability are  aim-specific  notions,  to  be decided on broadly 
scientific criteria case by case. We can express this point in full generality by saying that 
T’ has to be equally or even more scientifically virtuous than  T, where the appropriate 
criterion of virtuosity will be  fixed considering common scientific virtues, according to 
our specific purpose.
We  can  thus  offer  the  following  general  clarification  of  the  notion  of 
(in)dispensability:
[IND] (In)dispensability
A theory  M is dispensable from a given scientific theory  T if and only if there is a 
scientific theory T’ that does not include M-loaded statements and that:
a) is  ε-equivalent to T, where  ε is an appropriate equivalence relation;
b)  is  equally  or  more  virtuous  than  T according  to  an  appropriate  criterion  of 
virtuosity a.
If  T includes  M-loaded statements, and there is no scientific theory  T’ satisfying the 
above conditions, then M is indispensable to T.
A noteworthy consequence of this definition is that common talk of (in)dispensability 
is partly inaccurate. No theory is (in)dispensable  tout court to  another theory, but only 
relative to a certain equivalence relation. We should better speak of ε-a-(in)dispensability, 
rather  than  (in)dispensability  simpliciter.  (In)dispensability  is  an  essentially  relational 
21 According to Craig's Theorem [Craig 1956], given a recursively enumerable theory T, and a partition 
of  its  vocabulary  into an  observational  one,  o,  and  a  theoretical  one,  t,  then  there  exist  a  recursively 
axiomatizable theory T’, whose only non-logical vocabulary is o, comprising all and only the consequences 
of T expressible in o. Craig himself warned against the philosophical import of his result, claiming that the 
theorems of T’ obtained by his re-axiomatization method are not “psychologically or mathematically […] 
perspicuous” than those of T, this being “basically due to the mechanical and artificial way in which they 
are produced” (p. 49).
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notion22.
According  to  which  equivalence  relation  is  selected,  IA  can  have  different 
philosophical significance. Some minimal notion of indispensability can be thought of, if 
the equivalence relation ε is chosen on logico-syntactical grounds (e.g. if it is taken to be 
the  relation  of  having  the  same  expressive  power,  i.e.  of  including  either  the  same 
theorems  or  definitional  paraphrases  of  them).  But  more  demanding  notions  can  be 
thought of. For instance, one could suggest using such an  the equivalence relation like 
that of  having the same explanatory power, or cognate ones. Should theorists such as 
Field and Baker, building on the third of the four stances mentioned in § 2, be willing to 
endorse any of the minimal IA suggested above, they could easily obtain a specification 
of them based on the notion of explanatory power: once ε is appropriately specified in 
this way, it will straightforwardly follows that  M is indispensable to  T only it plays an 
indispensable explanatory role in T. We will come back to this below23.
5. What Does It Takes to Be an Indispensability Argument?
22 Colyvan’s  discussion  of  “the  role  of  confirmation  theory”  in  his  [2001,  pp.  78-81]  hints  to  the 
relational character of the notion of preferability. We take our clarification of (in)dispensability to improve 
on that suggestion.
23 As pointed out to us by an anonymous referee, our schematic definition of (in)dispensability assign no 
special  role  to  the  notion  of  applicability  of  a  mathematical  theory.  It  goes  without  saying  that  we  
acknowledge the greatest importance to the problem of the applicability of mathematics and to its role 
within the debate concerning IA, although it is impossible to discuss these issues here. We do believe, 
however, that, although the two notions will be certainly connected eventually, they can be beneficially 
treated  separately  at  a  general  level  of  analysis  as  ours.  Whether  and  how a  particular  conception of  
applicability affects a given version of IA—either by facilitating its conclusion, or by preventing it—is, 
indeed, something that we believe will have to be considered case by case, according to versions of the  
argument appropriately specified so to involve, for instance, one’s preferred notion of applicability in the  
specification of either the equivalence relation ε or the criterion of virtuosity α.
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In  this  section  we explore  which  assumptions  or  theoretical  ingredients  generally, 
beyond the notion of (in)dispensability, are required in order either to formulate or to 
endorse one of the minimal versions of IA presented above. We begin by considering the 
role  of  doctrines such as  naturalism and confirmational  holism.  On a fairly  common 
understanding—and in accordance with working definitions to be given below—these 
doctrines are only relevant for epistemic argument, being concerned as they are with the 
justification of scientific theories. Other assumptions will turn out as involved in non-
epistemic arguments also.
5.1 Confirmational holism and naturalism
Nothing—and a fortiori naturalism and holism—is required, in [RE] or [PE], to justify 
an all-and-only-clause like that in Colyvan’s argument, simply because there is no such 
clause to be justified at all. However, these doctrines may still be thought to be necessary 
conditions for justifying some of the premises of those arguments. A related concern is 
whether either doctrines might represent sufficient conditions.
Apart for a some aspect to be considered shortly, we will take for granted a general  
understanding of the notions involved (and of the vast debate concerning their proper 
characterization), and will merely state them in a convenient form for future reference, 
taking it that these formulations are those that philosophers concerned with IA have most 
commonly in mind:
[CH] Confirmational Holism: [Since the appreciation of empirical evidence is in no 
way  a  matter  of  comparing  a  single  fact  with  a  single  hypothesis,]  the 
confirmation of a single hypothesis or of a system of hypotheses comes together 
with (or entails) the confirmation of  a larger net of hypotheses (possibly of the 
whole net of hypotheses that our knowledge consists in).
[NAT]  Naturalism:  [Since  scientific  theories  are  the  only  source  of  genuine 
knowledge,] we are justified in believing to be true  only scientific theories, or 
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other  theories  (or  statements)  whose  truth  follows  from  the  truth  of  some 
scientific theories.
In what follows, we assume that it is legitimate to talk about the justification of math-
ematical and scientific theories independently of whether [CH] or [NAT] turn out to be 
necessary or unnecessary assumptions for the justification of any premise in the minimal 
arguments: [NAT], by itself, tells us only which sort of theories can be true, but is not 
taken as constitutive of the notion of justification; and whereas confirmation could be 
seen as constitutive of the justification of empirical theories, the way in which confirma-
tion is accrued need not be such: even if confirmation is holistic, the claim that a scientif-
ic theory is justified does not presuppose by itself [CH].
If one wishes, [CH] and [NAT] could be specifed further in order to have a distinctive 
focus on ontology, and would thus state, respectively, that  the confirmation of a single 
hypothesis or of a system of hypotheses comes together with (or entails) the confirmation 
of  the existence  of  all the entities that are quantified over in  a larger net of hypotheses 
(possibly in the whole net of hypotheses that our knowledge consists in); and that we are 
justified in acknowledging the existence only of those entities that are quantified over in 
our scientific theories. In these particular formulations, naturalism and holism could be 
taken to be explicitly stated—not just posited as background assumptions—in the first 
premise of Colyvan’s argument.
As stated, [NAT] entails the thesis that our scientifc theories are our only source of 
genuine knowledge about the world. Many versions of naturalism are available, but in 
order to make it both plausible and relevant to IA, one should steer clear from at least two 
readings.
On the one reading, naturalism is the too strong thesis, almost indistinguishable from 
nominalism,  that  only non-abstract  entities  can  be  acknowledged to exist.  Both what 
Colyvan [2001, ch. 3] calls ‘Eleatic Principle’, and the version of naturalism endorsed by 
e.g. Weir [2005] and Armstrong [1997, p. 5] are cases in point. We agree with Colyvan 
that if naturalism is involved in IA at all, it cannot be of this kind, since it stands in clear  
contradiction with the latter's conclusion.
On another reading, naturalism can be  too weak to be relevant to IA. In discussing 
Quinean naturalism, Colyvan [2001, pp. 23-24] distinguishes two strands: the “No First 
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Philosophy  Thesis”,  being  the  (normative)  thesis  that  in  approaching  “certain 
fundamental questions about our knowledge of the world” we should “look to science 
(and nowhere else) for the answers”; and the “Continuity Thesis”, being the (descriptive) 
thesis  that  “philosophy  is  continuous  with  science  and  that  together  they  aim  to 
investigate and explain the world around us”.  Colyvan himself  argues  that  these two 
theses are  intimately related in a complex way. One thing,  however,  should be clear, 
beyond Quinean exegesis. If the Continuity Thesis is meant to claim that both science 
and philosophy, where this involves a priori methods of inquiry, are our only legitimate 
sources of knowledge about the world,  the ensuing version of naturalism will  not  be 
suitable to the formulation of any empiricist argument. It can be suitable only in so far as 
one also adds that philosophy should abandon its traditional a priori methods and become 
a genuinely scientifc (in the sense of empirical  sciences) enterprise.  But  once this is 
added, empirical science and philosophy become utterly indistinguishable, and we come 
back to [NAT], with the only difference that in this new framework there is no philosophy 
left to be opposed to empirical sciences. The claim expressed in [NAT] seems to us to 
represent the most plausible  reading of naturalism adequate for the formulation of an 
empiricist  argument,  as  IA has  been traditionally  understood by Quine and his heirs. 
Notice,  in passing,  that we do believe that  the ‘only’ in the formulation of [NAT] is 
crucial in order to distinguish naturalism from scientifc realism; more on this below.
It now remains to be seen whether [CH] or [NAT] are either necessary or sufficient in 
order to justify any of the premises in [RE] and [PE]. Premises (ii) of each argument, as 
well  as  [PE]’s  premise  (iv),  are  beyond  any  suspect  of  guilty  here24.  So  we  better 
concentrate on premises (i) and (iii), common to both arguments. Premise (i) is liable to 
the charge of surreptitiously appealing to naturalism, whereas premise (iii) is liable to the 
charge of surreptitiously appealing to holism. Let us consider the latter first.
5.2 Can we dispense with confirmational holism?
One could imagine a very simple way to settle the question whether endorsing holism 
is necessary for  endorsing premise (iii) of  [RE] or [PE]. It would consist in suggesting 
that the relevant form of holism we are to consider in connection with [RE] or [PE] is not,  
properly  speaking,  confirmational  holism,  but  some  sort  of  holism  concerning 
justification, and that this form of holism just consists in the claim that justification of a 
24 But, cf. footnote (30), below.
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theory T whatsoever transmits to any other theory indispensable to T. In this case, the very 
claim that the justification of a scientific theory S transmits to a mathematical theory M 
indispensable to S would reduce to a mere instance of such a form of holism, and there 
would  then  be  much room for  claiming  that  endorsing  it  is  necessary  (beside  being 
obviously sufficient) for endorsing this claim, and, then, premise (iii) of [RE] or [PE]. 
It seems to us, however, that such a form of holism would be not only different from 
that which is usually at stake when the relation between holism and IA are discussed, 
which is confirmational holism proper, that is, a form of holism specifically concerned 
with confirmation, rather than with justification in general, but that it would also be a 
quite  Pickwickian  form  of  holism,  since  it  would  merely  require  that  justification 
transmits  from  a  theory  T to  another  theory  so  intimately  connected  to  it as  the 
indispensability of the latter for the former implies. Of course, in order to admit that this 
is  so,  one  should  maintain  that  indispensability  is  so  specified  as  to  warrant  this 
transmission. Still, this is not the point here. What is relevant is rather that such a form of 
holism would restrict the transmission of justification from theory to theory to a case in 
which the relevant theories are related by a certain sort of intimate connection. But, if a 
proper form of holism of justification should be defended, it should rather consists in 
claiming that justification transmits much more widely, along a larger net of theories or 
hypotheses (possibly along the whole net of hypotheses that our knowledge consists in), 
without constraints such as that of indispensability.
The situation would be even more outlandish if it were argued that the relevant form 
of holism consists in the claim that justification of a scientific theory  S transmits to a 
mathematical theory M indispensable to S (since it would be odd to consider that a sort of 
holism  concerned  with  justification,  in  general,  is  restricted  to  the  consideration  of 
scientific and mathematical theories) or that confirmational holism, as such, consists in 
the claim that justification of a scientific theory S transmits to a mathematical theory M 
indispensable to S (since it would be odd to consider that confirmational holism generally 
concerns justification, rather than confirmation). In this latter case, premise (iii) of [RE] 
or [PE] would just be the same as confirmational  holism and it would be beyond doubt 
that  that  endorsing the latter is necessary for endorsing the former.  It seems however 
20
plain  to  us  that  confirmational  holism is  a  different  and wider  thesis:  not  only  it  is 
concerned  with  confirmation  rather  than  with  justification,  but  also  it  is  not  merely 
limited to the transfer of confirmation from a scientific theory S to a mathematical theory 
M that is indispensable to S. 
All  these  considerations  lead  us  to  discard  from  the  very  beginning  the  simple 
possibilities just evoked, and to focus on confirmational holism proper, conceived as the 
very claim [CH].
A  first,  preliminary,  difficulty  is  the  following.  Apparently,  there  is  a  striking 
asymmetry between the condition expressed in premise (iii) and that expressed in [CH]: 
the latter seems to express an inference from a part to the whole, whereas premise (iii) 
seems to express an inference from the whole to a part. We need therefore to understand 
how the two might be related in any way relevant (either sufficiently or necessarily) for 
lending support to premise (iii).
Under a quite weak reading if it, [CH] states that when a single hypothesis  h of a 
theory S is confirmed, the whole S is confirmed, which we express in symbols by: ‘C(h) 
→ C(S)’, where ‘C(x)’ stands for ‘x is confirmed’. If we admit that a mathematical theory 
M involved in a scientific theory S counts as a cluster of hypotheses of S, one can replace 
here ‘C(h)’ with ‘C(M)’, so as to get the new implication ‘C(M) → C(S)’. It is however 
clear that this implication (be it admissible or not) is hardly useful in an argument whose 
purpose is that of building on considerations about some scientific theories in order to 
draw  conclusions  about  some  mathematical  theories  appropriately  connected  to  the 
former. At most, the reciprocal implication ‘C(S) → C(M)’ could be relevant. But if a 
mathematical theory M involved in a scientific theory S counts as a cluster of hypotheses 
of  S, and we take confirmation to be cumulative, i.e. to be such that a conjunction of 
hypothesis  (or  of  other  items  susceptible  of  confirmation)  can only  be  confirmed by 
confirming all its conjuncts (which entails, of course, that confirmation is d’emblée also 
distributive: if  a conjunction of hypothesis is confirmed all its conjuncts are so), this 
implication  is  trivial,  since,  whatever  confirmation  might  come  to  in  details,  it  is 
immediate to see that  under this conception a theory cannot count as confirmed as a 
whole  if  some  of  its  hypothesis  are  not  so.  Hence,  in  this  case,  arguing  for  this 
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implication requires no appeal to any strong and/or controversial thesis, as confirmational 
holism appears to be.
Things change, however, if a mathematical theory M involved in a scientific theory S is 
rather taken to count as an auxiliary theory that S appeals to, without encompassing it, or 
if  confirmation  is  not  taken  to  be  cumulative  (and  is,  then,  not  warranted  to  be 
distributive,  d’emblée), namely if it is admitted that a conjunction of hypothesis (or of 
other items susceptible of confirmation) can be directly confirmed as a whole (that is, 
without  passing  from a  confirmation  of  all  its  conjuncts).  Under  both  scenarios  the 
implication ‘C(S) → C(M)’ becomes far from trivial: it asserts that confirming (in one way 
or  another)  a  scientific  theory  S goes  with  (or  is  sufficient  for)  confirming either  an 
auxiliary mathematical theory M, which S appeals to it, but that is not included in S (under 
the  former  scenario),  or  a  mathematical  theory  M that  S encompasses,  even  if  the 
confirmation of M is not, as such, involved in that of S (under the latter scenario). It seems 
to  us  that  it  is  only  under  one  of  these  scenarios  that  there  is  room  for  plausibly 
considering the possibility that [RE] and [PE] be somehow related with [CH], provided, 
of course, that a reading of [CH] be adopted, according to which this thesis entails that 
confirming a scientific theory  S goes with (or is sufficient for) confirming an auxiliary 
mathematical  theory  M,  which  S appeals  to  it,  but  that  is  not  included  in  S,  or  a 
mathematical theory M that S encompasses, within a framework in which confirmation is 
not taken to be cumulative.
It  is  not  our  purpose here  to  argue  in  favour  either  of  one  of  these  two possible  
scenarios, or of this reading of [CH]. We merely suppose, for the sake of the argument, 
that both one of the former and the latter are admitted, while contending that if this is not 
so (that is, either both of the former or the latter are rejected), there is no plausible reason 
for connecting  [RE] and [PE] with [CH]. In other terms, we admit, for the sake of the 
argument, that [CH] entails ‘C(S) → C(M)’, provided that  S and  M are, respectively, a 
scientific and a mathematical theory, and that either S appeals to M, without encompassing 
it, or S encompasses M but confirmation is not taken to be cumulative. For short, in what 
follow we shall  call  ‘weak condition’ (for  reasons that will  become clear  below) the 
condition  involved  in  this  supposition,  namely  that  either  S appeals  to  M,  without 
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encompassing  it,  or  S encompasses  M,  provided  that  confirmation  is  not  taken to  be 
cumulative.
Now,  also  admitting,  under  this  same  condition,  that  ‘C(S)  → C(M)’ entails  [CH] 
would be quite implausible, since, however it might be conceived, confirmational holism 
can  certainly  not  be  reduced  to  a  thesis  about  the  confirmational  relation  between 
scientific and mathematical theories under some condition whatsoever. The possibility 
still  remains  open,  however,  of  admitting—for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  again,  but 
without falling into an evident oddity—that, when confronted with a scientific theory S 
and a mathematical theory  M, under the weak condition, one has no other ground than 
[CH] for arguing that C(S) → C(M). This is just what we admit. For the purpose of our 
following discussion,  we can then suppose that,  under  the weak condition,  endorsing 
[CH]  is  necessary  for  endorsing  premise  (iii)  of  [RE]  and  [PE]  if  endorsing  the 
implication ‘C(S) → C(M)’ is necessary for this. As regards whether [CH] is sufficient for 
endorsing this same premise, things are much simpler. Since, if [CH] entails  ‘C(S) → 
C(M)’ and ‘C(S) → C(M)’ entails this premises, then  [CH] entails  this premise. We can 
then limit our enquiry to this question: is endorsing the implication ‘C(S) → C(M)’, under 
the weak condition, necessary or sufficient for endorsing premise (iii) of [RE] and [PE]?
Let  us  come  back,  then,  to  this  premise.  It  states  that  justification  to  believe  a 
mathematical theory  M, indispensable to a scientific theory  S, to be true is a necessary 
condition  for  having  justification  to  believe  that  S is  true.  Let  us  call  this  the  ‘S-M 
justificatory  connection  under  indispensability’.  We  can  express  it  in  symbols  by: 
‘IND(M, S) →[J(S) → J(M)]’, where ‘J(x)’ stands for ‘we are justified in believing x true’. 
What we have to investigate is, then, whether the implication ‘C(S) → C(M)’ (which, for 
the  sake  of  the argument,  we take as  a  consequence of  [CH])  is  either  necessary  or 
sufficient to motivate the  S-M justificatory connection under indispensability, under the 
weak condition.
5.2.1 Is confirmational holism necessary for premise (iii)?
That confirmational holism might be unnecessary for IA has been already suggested, 
on different grounds, by several authors (e.g. Resnik [1995], Dieveney [2007], Azzouni 
23
[2009]), including Colyvan himself25. Taking much of this discussion for granted, what 
we are interested here is, as we have said, simply whether the implication ‘C(S) → C(M)’ 
needs to be assumed in order to defend our minimal (epistemic) versions of IA, especially  
whether it is required for upholding premise (iii) of [RE] and [PE]. In order for this to be 
the case, there must be no way of supporting the  S-M justificatory connection without 
appealing to this implication. We shall argue that it is not so. 
A  first  problem  arises  straightaway.  Both  our  admissions  that  [CH]  entails  the 
implication ‘C(S) → C(M)’, and that one has no other ground than [CH] for arguing that 
C(S)  → C(M),  have  been  conditioned  by  the  weak  condition.  This  last  condition  is, 
however,  much  weaker  than  that  involved  in  the  S-M justificatory  connection  under 
indispensability, namely that  M is indispensable to  S. Hence, one could contend that, in 
the case where the latter condition obtains, i.e. when M is indispensable to S, one should 
rely on grounds other than [CH] for arguing that C(S) → C(M). Insofar as we are not at all 
willing to discard this possibility (that we rather consider favourably, as we shall  see 
later), we suggest to firstly abstract from the supposition that M is indispensable to S, by 
resting content with the weaker supposition that S and M are, respectively, a scientific and 
a mathematical theory and that the weak condition obtains. We want then, firstly, to argue 
against the view that, under this condition, endorsing  the implication ‘C(S) → C(M)’—
and then [CH]—is necessary for endorsing that justification to believe M is a necessary 
condition for having justification to believe that S is true. Let us call this last claim the ‘S-
M justificatory connection’,  tout court. We can express it in symbols by: ‘J(S) → J(M)’. 
We  shall  come  back  later  to  the  question  whether,  under  the  weak  condition,  the 
implication ‘C(S) → C(M)’ (taken as a consequence of [CH]) is necessary to motivate the 
S-M justificatory connection under indispensability. 
25Cf.  Colyvan  [2001],  p.  37:  “As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  argument  can  be  made  to  stand  without 
confirmational  holism:  it's  just  that  it  is  more  secure  with holism. The  problem is  that  naturalism  is 
somewhat vague about ontological commitment to the entities of our best scientifc theories. It quite clearly 
rules out entities not in our best scientifc theories, but there seems room for dispute about commitment to 
some of the entities that  are  in these theories.  Holism helps to block such a move since,  according to 
holism, it is the whole theory that is granted empirical support”. For discussion of this passage and other 
issues connected with holism in Colyvan’s framework, cf. Peressini [2003, pp. 220-222].
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Our first point is as follows. Under some conceptions of science, like falsificationism, 
the link between the confirmation of a scientific theory and its justification is severed. In 
such  conceptions,  empirical  confirmation  of  the  (testable)  hypotheses  of  a  scientific 
theory  S, whatever advantages may it deliver, and whatever it might be considered to 
consist  in,  will  not  essentially  contribute  to  the  justification  of  S.  Still,  even  if  one 
endorsed such views, one may of course still maintain, under the weak condition, the S-M 
justificatory  connection,  and,  a  fortiori,  the  S-M justificatory  connection  under 
indispensability. Even if it is conceded that confirmation is holistic, i.e. that [CH] is true, 
the fact that C(S) → C(M) will simply play no role, in these views, to support the claim 
that J(S) → J(M), under whatever supplementary condition. 
Another way of showing that, endorsing the implication ‘C(S) → C(M)’ is unnecessary 
for endorsing that the S-M justificatory connection, under the weak condition, consists in 
noticing that this connection could be (vacuously) endorsed by anyone considered to have 
reasons for taking M to be justified independently of any consideration about its role in, or 
with respect to S (and, then, a fortiori, of M’s being indispensable to S). This would be the 
case, for example, for anyone that considered to have a priori reasons for believing in the 
necessary truth of M (and would then, at most, take its indispensability to S together with 
S’s being justified as a welcome by-product):  the  S-M justificatory connection (and,  a 
fortiori, the S-M justificatory connection under indispensability) will be motivated without 
appealing to  holism, nor to confirmation at  all.  This would make whatever empirical 
confirmation  we  can  have  for  S (be  its  nature  holistic  or  not) immaterial  to  the 
justification of M. Such an option will certainly not be welcomed by many supporters of 
IA. On the one hand, many of them also adopt a form of naturalism that ban  a priori 
arguments. On the other hand, and most importantly, such an option seem to make IA 
pointless. Still nothing prevents one from accepting IA even under these circumstances26. 
In any case, what all this shows is that the  S-M justificatory connection is, in general, 
conceptually independent of the notion of confirmation (and a fortiori of [CH]), and is 
26See Sereni [2013] for a way in which Frege may be taken to have reasons—based on considerations 
on applicability—for endorsing premise (iii), despite being alien to a holist conception of confirmation and 
to the idea that confirmation is relevant for the justification of mathematical theories.
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then so also under the weak condition. More generally, one of the basic idea underlying 
IA (cf. e.g. Putnam [1975], p. 74), that one cannot be a realist about science and at the 
same time an anti-realist about mathematics, needs not be supported by confirmational 
holism27.
Le us concede, now, both that (against the first point) empirical confirmation is an 
essential ingredient to the justification of a scientific theory (i.e. that J(S) → C(S)), and 
that (against the second point) we are after a defence of the S-M justificatory connection, 
under the weak condition, which is not based on having reasons independent of M’s role 
in, or with respect to,  S (possibly  a priori ones) to believe in the necessary truth of  M. 
Since the S-M justificatory connection only consists in the implication ‘J(S) → J(M)’, for 
the other implication ‘C(S) → C(M)’ to be necessary for this connection it must be the 
case that (J(S) → J(M)) → (C(S) → C(M)). But once one explores ways of defending this 
implication, it becomes apparent that it is unmotivated.
Insofar as we have conceded that confirmation of  S is a necessary ingredient of its 
justification,  what  we  have  to  consider  is  whether,  under  the  weak  condition, 
[(J(S) → C(S)) & (J(S) → J(M))] → (C(S) → C(M)).  Suppose that S is justified. Then, for 
the premise of this implication, it  follows that  S is also confirmed and that  also  M is 
justified.  If  this  were  enough  for  concluding  that  M is  confirmed,  under  the  weak 
condition, our implication would be verified. But, why should be so? It would be so if,  
once S is justified, and then confirmed, the only way in which its justification could be 
transferred to  M, under the weak condition, were that  S’s confirmation transferred to  M, 
and  that  M’s  confirmation  were  sufficient  for  its  justification.  But  this  is  clearly 
unmotivated. Why should the only way in which justification of  S transfers to  M, under 
the weak condition, be through the transfer of S’s confirmation to M? We have assumed 
that confirmation of S is necessary for its justification, not that it is also sufficient; so it 
could  well  be  the  case  that  M’s  justification  be  due,  under  the  weak  condition,  to 
ingredients of S’s justification other than its confirmation. Moreover, why (both under the 
27Putnam would clearly endorse premise (iii). But he has recently dispelled any doubt that his endorsing 
it hinges on holism: “I have never claimed that mathematics is ‘confirmed’ by its applications in physics” 
(cf. Putnam [2012, p. 188]). 
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weak condition or not) should  M’s confirmation be sufficient for its justification? And 
why,  anyway,  should  one  be  forced  to  admit  that  a  mathematical  theory  is  open  to 
confirmation, in order to conclude that M is justified provided that S is so and the weak 
condition obtains?
The situation does not change essentially if the supposition that the confirmation of S 
is a necessary ingredient of its justification is replaced by the other supposition that the 
confirmation of  S is sufficient of its justification. In this case, what we would have to 
consider is whether, under the weak condition, [(C(S) → J(S)) & (J(S) → J(M))] → (C(S) 
→ C(M)). Suppose that S is confirmed; then, for the premise of this implication, it follows 
that M is justified. Again, if this were enough for concluding that M is confirmed, under 
the weak condition, our implication would be verified. But, again, this is unjustified, as 
well as it is unjustified that, from these suppositions it follows that a mathematical theory 
is open to confirmation (both under the weak condition or not).
All in all, the only way of claiming that [CH] is necessary for the justification of the S-
M justificatory  connection  under  the  weak  condition  is  to  assume  that,  under  this 
condition,  the  confirmation  of  S and  the  justification  of  M are  sufficient  for  the 
justification of  S and for the confirmation of  M,  that  is,  that  (C(S) → J(S)) & (J(M)  → 
C(M)), since it is easy to see that ‘[(C(S) → J(S)) & (J(M) → C(M)) & (J(S) → J(M))] → 
(C(S) → C(M))’ is a tautology. Still, supposing that the confirmation of S is sufficient for 
its  justification,  is  utterly  implausible,  since it  results in disregarding the well-known 
issue  that  empirical  confirmation  will  not  distinguish  between  incompatible  and  still 
empirically equivalent theories, and that in most cases what bestows justification on a 
theory is,  besides confirmation,  a combination of many other virtues (some of which 
being even a priori), such as simplicity, unificatory power, explicatory power, ontological 
parsimony, fruitfulness. Moreover, supposing that the justification of M is sufficient for its 
confirmation  requires  admitting  that  a  mathematical  theory  is  open  to  confirmation, 
which is something that does seem to be required neither by the weak condition, nor by 
the  S-M justificatory  connection  under  this  same  condition.  Of  course,  if  this  were 
admitted,  and  were  also  admitted  that  the  justification  of  M is  sufficient  for  its 
confirmation, one could add a supplementary conclusion to  [RE] to the effect that the 
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relevant mathematical theories are not merely justified, but also confirmed, but this is far 
from mandatory for [RE] to work.
Up to here, we have avoided considering M as indispensable to S, by merely supposing 
that the weak condition obtains and investigating whether endorsing [CH] could be taken 
as necessary for endorsing the  S-M justificatory connection under this condition. Let us 
now suppose that M is indispensable to S, as any version of AI requires, and investigate 
whether endorsing [CH] could be taken as necessary for endorsing the S-M justificatory 
connection under indispensability, that is the premise (iii) of [RE] and [PE]. It seems to 
us that, in this case, even if one accepts that confirmation is relevant, necessary or even 
sufficient for the justification of M, it become still more evident that [CH] is not required 
for the purpose. Indeed, if we take M as indispensable to S, it is reasonable to expect that 
the grounds for arguing that C(S)  → C(M)  should be sought in that very fact,  i.e.  in 
whatever intimate connection is established between  S and  M by the very fact that the 
latter is indispensable to the former. This is not to take for granted that the notion of 
indispensability,  under  whatever  specification,  together  with  the  admission  that  M is 
indispensable to S (under the relevant specification), will be able by itself to deliver these 
grounds. As a matter of fact, arguing that it is so does should be one of the main tasks of a 
supporter of IA. The point is just that, once the indispensability of M to S is assumed, it is 
reasonable to expect that it, and it alone, would allow to claim that C(S) → C(M), without 
requiring the help of [CH], which is, in fact, a much wider claim not constrained by an 
indispensability condition28.
The unpalatable consequences of the assumption of [CH] in IA when compared to 
actual  mathematical practice—especially  with the conscious use by scientists  of false 
assumptions and idealizations—has been stressed by Maddy [1992]29. Apart from this, the 
28 Cf. the observation made at the very beginning of the present § 5.2.
29 Hellmann [1999] attempts at avoiding these and others unpalatable consequences by suggesting that 
even though confirmation is holistic and it is conceded that it is transferred from the testable hypotheses of 
a theory to its inner parts, it should not be taken to transfer equally, so that different parts of a theory, like  
those expressing idealized conditions,  or  mathematical  hypotheses,  could  be taken to  be  confirmed to 
different degrees. Even if Hellman is right, his suggestion does not affect our present points concerning the 
non-necessity of confirmational holism for endorsing IA. 
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main point, for us, is that [CH] is either irrelevant for AI (in the case in which no clear 
appropriate connection between justification and confirmation is admitted), or it  is an 
overkilling (in the case in which this appropriate connection is admitted), since it delivers 
much more than it is actually required to defend IA, thus being an unnecessarily strong 
thesis30. 
Indeed, the mere fact that an appeal to indispensability is thought to be relevant—
which is already emphasised by the very expression ‘indispensability argument’ usually 
chosen to denote the argument under consideration—seems to be an indicator that such 
an argument  essentially  grounded on that  notion,  and not  on the much wider  one of 
confirmational holism.
True, holism is  usually  required  to  rule  out  the  possibility  that  statements  about 
theoretical  or  mathematical  objects  might  be  confirmation-resistant,  as  opposed  to 
observational statements. However, if in [PE] one endorses, following Quine, a criterion 
for ontological commitment that is uniform across statements—i.e. based on the logical 
form of statements and content-neutral—one will have as a consequences that all entities 
whose existence is  entailed by one’s criterion will  be said to exist,  observational and 
theoretical  alike.  If  one believes in  the truth of premises (i)-(iii)  of [PE],  and has an 
uniform  criterion  of  ontological  commitment,  confirmational  holism,  again,  is  not 
needed, for this purpose31.
30  We shall come back in § 5.2.2 to the sufficiency of [CH] and the conditions it requires in terms of the 
connections between justification and confirmation.
31 One could claim, however, that  some form of holism (presumably non-confirmational in nature) is 
somehow presupposed by any criterion of ontological commitment uniform across statements, namely in 
order to ensure that  such a criterion uniformly applies both to scientific and to mathematical  theories. 
Against this latter supposition, one could argue, for example, that the notion of aboutness employed in 
premise (iv) cannot be given a content-neutral characterization, and does not apply to mathematical objects. 
A case in point is Azzouni’s [1998, 2004] suggested alternative to [QC]. One could think, then, that an 
appropriate form of holism is required for rejecting this possibility. Notice, however, that this is far from 
necessary:  even if some understanding of [QC] or, better, some specification of the schematic notion of 
aboutness employed in premise (iv) of [PE] and [PnE] (or of other schematic notions employed in some of 
our versions of IA), turned out somehow to presuppose some form of holism, this would leave untouched 
that an epistemic version of IA, and, then, a fortiori, IA as such, do not necessarily require any appeal to it; 
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5.2.2 Is confirmational holism sufficient for premise (iii)?
As regards the sufficiency of endorsing [CH] for endorsing premise (iii) of [RE] and 
[PE], things are by far simpler. Since,  both supposing that  M is indispensable to  S,  or, 
merely, that the weak condition obtains, in order to draw the implication ‘J(S) → J(M)’ 
from the other implication ‘C(S) → C(M)’, it is necessary and sufficient to admit that J(S) 
→ C(S) and C(M) → J(M). Hence, for premise (iii) of [RE] and [PE] to follow from [CH] 
it  is  sufficient  that  confirmation  for  the  relevant  scientific  theories  is  taken  to  be 
necessary for their justification, and confirmation for the relevant mathematical theories 
is  taken  to  be  sufficient  for  their  justification.  Moreover,  if  we  suppose  that,  when 
confronted with the relevant theories  S and  M, one has no other ground than [CH] for 
arguing  that  C(S)  → C(M),  these  two  conditions  (taken  together)  are  also  necessary. 
Under this supposition,  wondering whether endorsing [CH] is sufficient for endorsing 
premise  (iii)  of  [RE]  and  [PE]  reduces  to  wondering  whether  confirmation  for  the 
relevant scientific theories is necessary for their justification, and confirmation for the 
relevant mathematical theories is sufficient for their justification.
The former of these conditions could be questioned, but it seems to us to be safely 
admissible, in general, that is, for most of our scientific theories32. For it is plausible to 
grant that, in general, any virtue a scientific theory may have will not confer justification 
to it in absence of confirmation.
The latter condition is more questionable, instead. One reason of this has already been 
at most this thesis would be involved in some particular instances of such an argument (just as it happens 
for IBE: cf. footnote 35 below).
32 One could, however, question this condition in some quite particular cases, as those involving highly 
theoretical physical theories, for example string theory. One could indeed maintain that in cases like these,  
the relevant scientific theories can be justified, and are actually considered to be so, independently of any  
empirical confirmation they may receive or have received. It is more likely, however, that in the complete 
absence of empirical confirmation we would not take ourselves to be justified, however weakly, in taking a  
scientific theory to be true; rather, such scientific theory will be said to enjoy a number of virtues that will 
merely  make  it  acceptable  in  the  scientific  community  for  many  practical  and  theoretical  purposes. 
Nonetheless, this form of acceptance, it  goes without saying, will not be strong enough to support the 
conclusion(s) of IA, in any of the versions we have discussed here.
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mentioned: consenting to it  requires admitting that mathematical  theories  are open to 
confirmation, which could be plausibly questioned (and is, in any case, nor required for 
endorsing IA). Another reason is that contending that confirmation of a mathematical 
theory,  whatever  it  might  be  taken  to  be,  is  sufficient  for  its  justification  results  in 
disregarding any a priori virtue that such a theory could have as a necessary ingredient of 
its justification. Finally, even someone, presumably endorsing a proto-empiricist view on 
mathematics, who is ready to admit that mathematical theories are open to confirmation, 
and that no a priori virtue of a mathematical theory is required for it to be justified (when 
it  is  well  supported by  a posteriori or  empirical evidences) could face that the same 
difficulty raised above (§ 5.2.1) for the thesis that confirmation of a scientific theory is 
sufficient for its justification also applies, mutatis mutandis, in the case of mathematical 
theories.
5.3 Can we dispense with naturalism?
What about now premise (i) of [RE] and [PE]? Do we need to assume naturalism, in 
any form, in order to claim that we are justified in believing some scientific theory to be 
true?  What seems clear is that some form of scientific realism will have to be assumed. 
For a fairly standard characterization, we can describe scientific realism as the thesis that 
our mature scientific theories are true, or, at least, approximately true descriptions of an 
external,  mind-independent  reality,  that  their  statements  should be  interpreted at  face 
value (both when they speak of observable entities and when they speak of theoretical 
ones), and that the objects of which they speak do inhabit the world (cf. Psillos [1999, p. 
xix] for a more extended definition on these lines). In order to defend premise ( i) in 
[RnE] and [PnE],  we need to maintain that there are true scientific theories, and this 
implies a form of scientific realism. Moreover, some arguably milder form of scientific 
realism will be needed also for defending premise (i) in [RE] and [PE]. This milder form 
of realism should at  least  accept  that we are justified in believing that there are true 
scientific theories (without necessarily taking the further step of claiming that there are, 
or were, or will be some such)33.
33 Notice that scientific realism, as formulated here, entails that (we are justified to believe that) the 
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Now,  scientific  realism,  in  one  form or  other,  is  likely  to  be  a  basic  assumption 
underlying naturalism. Quine himself listed “unregenerate realism” among the sources of 
naturalism (Quine [1975], p. 72). But in order to justify premise (i) of [RE] and [PE] only 
some form of scientific  realism is  needed,  and whereas  naturalism implies (or  might 
imply, depending on the chosen formulation) scientific realism, the latter does not imply 
the former. Where naturalism hinges on endorsing that scientific theories are the only 
source of genuine knowledge, with the result that we are justified in believing to be true 
only these theories or those whose truth follows from the latter’s truth, scientific realism 
only implies that scientific theories are a kind of theories in whose truth we are allowed 
to be justified. This is not to deny that realism can be fruitfully combined with a naturalist  
position. It can even be maintained that the adoption of naturalism facilitates—since it  
implies it—the adoption of scientific realism. However, nothing prevents someone who 
believes,  for  example,  that  genuinely  philosophical  a priori  arguments  are  a  reliable 
source of knowledge, from believing, provided that conflicting results are avoided, that 
(mature, predictively successful, well-confirmed, etc.) scientific theories are sufficiently 
reliable sources too. It is not difficult to think of scientific realists that are not naturalists. 
For an illustrious case, consider Frege, who had realistic views about scientific inquiry 
but surely was not a naturalist, as his views on mathematics show. 
It then seems that insofar as endorsing [NAT] requires (entails) endorsing  scientific 
realism, the former could thus well be a sufficient for endorsing premise (i) of [RE] and 
[PE], but clearly it is not necessary34.
entities (both observable and theoretical) which are spoken of in mature scientific theories exist (at least, if  
we admit that  a statement of a  scientific  theory cannot be true if  these entities  does not exist).  Some  
remarks are in order. First, one may adopt forms of realism—e.g. structural realism—where the existence 
of  these  individual entities  is  not  entailed;  this version  of  realism would still  be  adequate to  motivate 
premise (i) in all minimal arguments. Second, it  would be odd to assume that scientific realism entails  
either  the  existence  of  the  mathematical  entities  mentioned  in  mathematical  statements,  or  that  the 
mathematics used in science is true; assuming scientific realism does not beg the question with regards to 
the conclusion of neither platonist or realist versions of IA, and can be safely assumed in both.
34 To our knowledge, the only other  version of  IA which is  explicitly claimed by its  proponent to  
dispense with naturalism is the one offered by Azzouni [2009]. We’ll discuss this below.
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This  being  established,  one  could  still  wonder  whether  endorsing  [NAT]  is  either 
necessary  of  sufficient  for  endorsing  another  premise  of [RE]  and  [PE].  The  only 
plausible candidate for this is premise (iii), which plays in these arguments the role that 
premise (i) of Colyvan’s argument plays in this latter argument. As we have mentioned in 
§  2,  Colyvan  indeed  argues  that  naturalism is  required  in  order  to  justify  the only-
direction of this latter premise. Still, we have also already observed that this direction is, 
in fact, useless for drawing the argument’s conclusion, and has, accordingly, no correlate 
in premise (iii) of [RE] and [PE].
At most, then, one can argue that the endorsement of [NAT] is necessary for endorsing 
a strengthened variant of this premise, that would state that we are justified in believing 
true all and only the mathematical theories that are indispensable to scientific theories 
that we are justified in believing to be true. This variant would still be involved only in 
variants of  [RE] and [PE]  whose conclusions are, in turn, strengthened variants of the 
conclusions  of  these  arguments,  stating  not  only  sufficient  conditions  for  our  being 
justified,  respectively,  in  believing  true  the  relevant  mathematical  theories,  and  in 
believing the objects which these are about to exist.
6 Retrieving common arguments from the minimal arguments
It is easy to see how the suggested minimal versions of IA could serve as a basis for 
the  stances  on  IA  represented  by  Putnam’s,  Colyvan’s  and  Baker’s  arguments, 
respectively (cf. § 2). Putnam’s argument is nothing but a variant of [PnE] (or, depending 
on the reading of Putnam’s text, [PE]). Colyvan’s argument is a variant of the epistemic 
version of IA that results from adding to premise (iii) of [PE] the redundant assumption 
that  we  are  justified  in  believing  true  only  the  mathematical  theories  that  are 
indispensable to scientific theories that we are justified in believing to be true35. Finally, 
as anticipated at the end of § 4, Baker’s Enhanced Indispensability Argument, can be 
retrieved  from  [PE]  once  an  appropriate  equivalence  relation  ε is  selected  in  the 
35 Together  with  what  we  have  said  in  §  5.2.1,  this  entails  that  Colyvan’s  argument  is,  in  fact, 
independent of confirmational holism, despite his own initial claim in Colyvan [2001, p. 12] (cf. the quote  
relative to footnote 5; but cf. also footnote 24).
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specification of  the  notion of  (in)dispensability,  e.g.  the  relation of  having the  same 
explanatory power36.
Things are more complex with arguments in the pragmatic stance. 
Let us begin with Resnik’s. This is very different in form from all other representative 
versions of IA that we have reviewed. It seems clear that it dispenses with confirmational 
holism37. It is instead not clear whether it also dispenses from naturalism. According to 
Resnik himself the passage from its premise (vi) to (vii) is justified, by naturalism, which 
he briefly defines as the thesis that “natural science is our ultimate arbiter of truth and 
existence”38, and considers as suitable for ruling out scepticism about the justification and 
truth of our scientific theories. Still, it is not clear how naturalism can warrant the passage  
from the justification of some theories, and particularly of mathematical ones, to their 
truth, a passage which is surely hard to secure. More generally, it is far from clear that 
Resnik argument be valid (or admit, at least, a valid rephrasing). It is thus not surprising 
that it  is  hard to  retrieve it  from our minimal versions,  which are clearly valid.  This 
remains, however, an unicum with respect to the ongoing debate. 
Notice, on the other hand, that it is not clear whether the role played by the notion of 
justification in Resnik’s argument  is  in any sense cognate to that played by it  in our 
minimal  arguments.  We  take  justification  as  applying  to  statements  or  bodies  of 
statements, and as being justification for their truth, and not just for their adoption for 
whatever practical reasons. Resnik does firstly conceives justification as applying (if not 
uniquely,  also)  to  acts,  rather  than  bodies  of  statements;  and  secondly  he  bases  our 
36 Discussion of the Enhanced Indispensability Argument often pertains to the alleged role that inference 
to  the best  explanation (IBE)  may have  in  IA.  Still,  insofar  as  the  minimal  version of  this  argument, 
provided by  [PE] under the mentioned specifications, is concerned, no appeal to  IBE is required, and its 
validity need then not be presupposed. This does not mean that IBE cannot be involved in any specification 
of the minimal versions of IA. Indeed, it could be involved in some such specifications in two ways: the  
equivalence relation  ε in the schematic definition of the notion of (in)dispensability could be specified 
through  the  notion  of  explanation  in  a  way that  presupposes  the  validity  of  IBE;  or  the  criterion  of 
virtuosity a in that same definition could itself presuppose the validity of IBE.
37 This is what Resnik himself seems to imply in the quote relative to footnote 10.
38 Resnik [1995, p. 166; 1997, p. 45].
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“accepting as true such mathematics as science uses” on the pragmatic reason that “we 
are justified in doing science” and that science, when considered in its practice, proceeds 
through various mathematical assumptions—and not rather on the fact that any scientific 
theory is  even approximately true.  If  Resnik’s argument  were (valid  and)  sound, this 
could be see as an advantage,  since it  would make the argument  independent  of the 
supposition that some scientific theories are true.  If (valid and) sound, this argument 
would thus dispense with scientific realism, as Resnik [1997, pp.46-47] suggests (and this 
should be so despite Resnik’s quite doubtful claim that the passage from conclusion (vi) 
to conclusion (vii) depends on naturalism, understood as the thesis that “natural science is 
our  ultimate arbiter  of  truth and existence”,  a  thesis  which  could hardly be taken as 
independent from a form of scientific realism).
Let us consider now Azzouni’s argument, namely his Assertoric-use QP39. It deserves 
more careful consideration, since it is the one that comes closest to resembling, at least in 
spirit, some of our suggested minimal version, as least insofar as it is, and, as we said in § 
2,  explicitly  meant  to  avoid presupposition of  either  holism or naturalism40.  Also the 
distinction between arguments for mathematical realism and for platonism is suggested 
by Azzouni [2004], who questions [QC] and argues at length that IA can at most be an 
argument  for  the  truth  of  mathematical  theories,  but  that  it  falls  short  of  supporting 
platonism41.
The  first  thing  to  be  noticed  is  that  Azzouni’s  Assertoric-use  QP stems  from  an 
interpretation of the “enthymematic blueprint” quoted above in § 2, but is not regimented 
in  the  form  of  a  codified  non-enthymematic  (valid)  argument  with  enumerated  and 
explicitly stated premises and conclusion(s). Enquiring whether it can be retrieved from 
one  of  our  minimal  versions  of  IA requires,  then,  a  reinterpretation  of  Azzouni’s 
proposals. 
Prima facie, given that there is no mention of epistemic notions like justification in 
Azzouni’s blueprint, the relevant minimal version of IA with which his argument should 
39 Cf. § 2, above.
40 Azzouni [2009], especially p. 147, fn. 11.
41 Cf also Azzouni [2009],  p. 140, note 2; p. 147, note 11.
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be compared seems to be [RnE].  However,  the way in which Azzouni  motivates  the 
passage from the blueprint to the Assertoric-use QP suggests another option.
Azzouni’s  strategy  for  obtaining  the  Assertoric-use  QP  depends,  firstly,  on  the 
specification of the single premise of the former, i.e. ‘certain statements that quantify 
over mathematical entities are indispensable to science’, as the claim that the “assertoric 
use”  of  the  relevant  statements,  which  quantify  over  mathematical  entities,  is 
indispensable to science. According to Azzouni42, it is an empirical fact that people use 
certain  statements  assertorically  while  doing  science,  for  the  two aims  of  presenting 
statements as following from other statements previously made (“deductive use”) and of 
describing state of affairs (“representational use”). A second empirical fact is said to be43 
that given our ordinary understanding of the word ‘true’, the assertoric use of a statement 
p entails, via Tarksi’s biconditionals, the commitment of those who assertorically use p to 
the truth of  p.  From this second empirical  fact,  it  follows that the  conclusion  of the 
blueprint should be intended as the claim that we are committed to the truth of those 
statements whose assertoric use is indispensable to science. Although different readings 
can be given to the expression ‘we are committed to the truth of p’, we take it that the 
more  plausible  one,  consistent  with  Azzouni’s  discussion,  is  as  ‘we  are  justified  in 
believing p true’44. Assuming that this is so, it follows that the most appropriate among 
our minimal versions of IA to be compared with Azzouni’s Assertoric-use QP is [RE].
Two  questions  arise  here:  whether  Azzouni’s  version  of  IA is  eventually  to  be 
42Cf. Azzouni [2009, p. 140-141].
43 Ibidem, p. 141.
44 The sense in which we are justified in believing a mathematical statement true is meant, however, to 
be  in  some  sense  “stronger”  [cf.  Azzouni  2009,  p.  147]  than  that  licensed  by  Resnik’s  argument  on 
pragmatic grounds: as Azzouni claims, “it isn’t that we’re ‘justified’ in describing an assertorically-used 
sentence as true; Tarski biconditionals make the use of the truth predicate  nonnegotiable”. Whatever this 
distinction comes to in details, it does not seem that from the assertoric use of a statement p the truth itself 
of p can follow, over and beyond our commitment to take p as true. Even if this entails that the conclusion 
of the Assertoric-use QP will be, as a matter of fact, a different, epistemic, version of the conclusion of 
Azzouni’s proposed blueprint (i.e. ‘Those statements are true’), we still see this as the most reasonable 
outcome of Azzouni’s discussion; we acknowledge, however, that this reading can be subject to controversy 
depending on how our “commitment” to the truth of a statement is understood.
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considered more minimal than [RE]; and whether his  version can indeed be retrieved 
from [RE].
As to the first question, a clue for a positive answer could come from the fact that 
[RE] appeals to the notion of truth (thought of as a schematic notion, variously specifi-
able), whereas Azzouni’s argument doesn’t explicitly appear to do so. Still, the latter re-
lies on the fact that assertoric use of mathematical statements is indispensable to scientif-
ic practice, and this is taken to entail commitment to the truth of these statements just in 
virtue of the Tarskian biconditionals which “transform assertoric uses into truth-commit-
ments”45. Moreover, Azzouni argues46, that “if I  assertorically use a sentence47, I recog-
nize myself as bound by implication to the original sentence prefixed by ‘It’s true that ...  
’ ”, which results in maintaining that there is a rather intimate connection between asser-
tion and truth. But if this is so, then truth, if not explicitly used in the premises of the ar-
gument, is presupposed by the very notions of assertion and assertoric use by means of 
which the argument is built. It may even well be explicitly mentioned in a premise of the 
argument once all its underlying assumptions are brought to the fore48. Hence, if the issue 
is the appeal to some notion of truth, then, it is far from clear that Azzouni’s argument is 
in any sense more minimal than [RE].
A second related clue for a positive answer to the first question is that the conclusion 
of Azzouni’s Assertoric-use QP appears to be derived without explicitly assuming that we 
are justified in believing some scientific theories to be true. However, as Azzouni himself 
acknowledges49, his argument has as accompanying premise “the  au-indispensability of 
45 Azzouni [2009], p. 142.
46 Azzouni [2009], p. 141.
47 Azzouni  seems  to  indifferently  use  in  his  paper  the  terms  ‘sentence’ and  ‘statement’.  While 
maintaining the term ‘sentence’ in  all  our  quotations from Azzouni’s  paper where  it  occurs,  we shall,  
instead, invariably use the terms ‘statement’, as we do throughout our paper.
48Notice that no particular conception of truth is presupposed in our minimal versions, so that one is at 
liberty to use whatever notion one prefers in the specification of  the schematic arguments (included a  
disquotational one). Hence, the question here is not whether we, as opposed to Azzouni, make use of some 
particular conception of truth, but whether any notion of truth is involved at all in the relevant versions of 
IA.
49 Azzouni [2009], p. 144.
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the scientific sentences themselves (given a commitment to the scientific project)”, where 
the term ‘au-indispensability’ is a shortened form of ‘indispensability of the assertoric 
use’. It seems, moreover, plausible, in the light of our previous discussion, to understand 
the commitment to the scientific project as a justification in the truth of these scientific 
statements, and then, presumably, in some scientific theories. 
Be that as it may, these considerations suggest that Azzouni’s argument is possibly not 
to be considered more minimal than [RE], but rather very close to it, at least in spirit. We 
should then move to our second question.
What we have said so far suggests to specify both the single premise and the conclu-
sion of Azzouni’s blueprint by making explicit the assumption of our commitment to the 
scientific project intended as a commitment to (the truth) of those statements whose as-
sortoric use is indispensable to this project, and to state the conclusion in an epistemic 
form. The ensuing formulation will thus be this:
Assertoric-use QP (I)
i) We are committed to (the truth of) those statements that are au-indispensable to the scientific project; 
ii) Some  statements  that  quantify  over  mathematical  entities  are  au-indispensable  to  the  scientific 
project; 
------------------------------ 
iii) We are committed to (the truth of) these statements.
Above we have mentioned the accompanying premise of Azzouni’s argument concern-
ing the “au-indispensability of the scientific sentences themselves”. The whole passage 
where this premises is put forward seems to suggest that the indispensability of the as-
sertoric use of the relevant statements that quantify over mathematical entities is to be, as 
it were, split into the au-indispensability of both some scientific and some mathematical 
statements. It goes as follows50: “I […] read the premise of the ethymemic blueprint of 
the QP as stating that many sentences of mathematics are  au-indispensable to science. 
Accompanying this premise is the assumption of the au-indispensability of the scientific 
50 The reference is, of course, the same as in footnote (48).
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sentences themselves (given a commitment to the scientific project)”. The statements that 
quantify  over  mathematical  entities  and  are  au-indispensable  to  the  scientific  project 
mentioned in Asseroric-use QP (I) seem here to be those that in this passage are referred 
to as ‘sentences of mathematics [that] are  au-indispensable to science’51. This suggests 
that the statements here referred to as ‘the scientific sentences themselves’ do not quanti-
fy over mathematical entities, but are such that  they can be assertorically used only if 
some mathematical statements (which rather do) are so used (for example insofar as the 
former involve individual or predicate constants defined though the latter). It would fol-
low that  the  au-indispensability to the scientific project of the mathematical statements 
mentioned in Asseroric-use QP (I) just depends on this, namely on their being such that 
those scientific statements whose assertoric use is indispensable to the scientific project 
are such that they can be assertorically used only if these mathematical statements are so 
used. If we express this condition by saying that the latter statements are  au-indispens-
able to the former, Assertoric-use QP (I) can then be restated and further expanded as fol-
lows:
Assertoric-use QP (II)
i) We are committed to (the truth of) those statements that are au-indispensable to the scientific project; 
ii) Some mathematical statements are au-indispensable to some statements that are au-indispensable to 
the scientific project;
iii) We are committed to the truth of those statements that are au-indispensable to the scientific project 
only if we are committed to the truth of those mathematical statements that are au-indispensable to 
them;
------------------------------ 
iv) We are committed to (the truth of) these mathematical statements.
This latter version of IA is clearly similar, in structure and content, to [RE]. Once it is 
conceded that  ‘being commitment to the scientific project’ can be interpreted as  ‘being 
justified in believing some scientific theories to be true’, premise (i) of Assertoric-use QP 
51 Cf. footnote (46) above.
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(II)  can,  indeed,  be  conceived  as  a  specification  of  premise  (i)  of  [RE].  Following 
Azzouni, one may say that the former is justified by the empirical fact that when we as-
sertorically use a statement  p, we are committed (via Tarski biconditionals) to the truth 
of. If premise (ii) of [RE] is then specified by employing the notion of assertoric use in 
the specification of the ε equivalence relation involved in the schematic notion of indis-
pensability—so that the assertoric use of certain mathematical statements turns out to be 
indispensable to the assertoric use of those scientific statements that we must assertorical-
ly use if we are committed to the scientific project—what one gets is just premise (ii) of 
Assertoric-use QP (II). As regards premise (iii), it is easy to see that the S-M justificatory 
connection can be specified by considering that the commitment to the truth of the state-
ments of S, following via Tarski biconditionals from their assertoric use, can be granted 
only in presence of a similar commitment, via the same route, for the mathematical state-
ments of  M that  are  au-indispensable to  S:  this  is  does  not  seem to add nothing that 
Azzouni would not consider as implicit in his own argument52. Premise (iii) of Assertoric-
use QP (II) just results from this specification of premise (iii) of [RE], with the implicit 
assumption that assertoric use of p entails commitment to the truth of p. Once [RE] is ap-
propriately specified, then, the conclusion of Assertoric-use QP (II) is nothing by an al-
ternative though equivalent formulation of the conclusion of [RE], as one may expect by 
alternative versions of an argument that are meant to support a common conclusion.
If we are correct, and Assertoric-use QP (II) is a plausible reconstruction, in explicit  
52 Notice also that Azzouni explicitly objects to forms of fictionalism that constitute the most obvious 
strategies for rejecting premise (iii). In the following passage (Azzouni [2009], p. 143), it is easy so read 
something very close to the suggested specification of premise (iii) of [RE]:
One issue to be explored in this paper is whether the assertoric use of many 
statements  of  ordinary science  is  compatible  with one  or  another  construal  of  the 
mathematical statements utilized in science as not assertorically used (and therefore, 
as  either  not  true-apt or  as  false).  I’ll  show that  a  position that  takes us as  truth-
committed to statements in any area where mathematics is applied, while assuming 
that we aren’t simultaneously truth-committed to that mathematics, is unstable.
This, if needed, seems to be another piece of evidence that premise (iii) can be upheld without appealing 
to confirmational holism.
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non-enthymematic form, of the version of IA that Azzouni has in mind, then it seems sus-
ceptible of being retrieved from [RE] through appropriate specifications of the notions in-
volved53.
7. The philosophical significance of the indispensability argument
Much of the recent discussion on IA has focused on holism and naturalism.  Many 
authors have either criticized IA, taking Colyvan's as the most relevant formulation, or 
offered alternative versions of it. Both supporters and critics, with few exceptions we 
have mentioned above, take naturalism and holism to be essential to this argument, or, 
more  generally,  to  what  is  usually  referred  to  as  ‘the  Quine-Putnam Indispensability 
Argument’, and discuss the alleged dependence of the argument on these doctrines. For 
example,  Maddy  [1992,  2007]  claims  that  IA fails  because  of  inescapable  clashes 
between the notions of holism and naturalism (as Quine conceived of it) and essential 
features  of  mathematical  and  scientific  practice  and methodology;  relying  on a  non-
holistic notion of confirmation, Sober [1993] argues that empirical evidence cannot even 
indirectly justify mathematical theories. 
As it turns out, minimal versions of IA can be devised that are far less demanding than 
the so-called Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument. Only scientific realism (beyond, 
obviously, a proper characterization of (in)dispensability) will be an essential ingredient 
in justifying premise (i) in [RE] and [RnE]. In order to obtain a platonist conclusion, thus 
to support [PE] and [PnE], only an appropriate criterion for ontological commitment—
arguably, Quine’s54—needs to be further assumed (together with what is needed to justify 
53 This is, of course, not intended to suggest that  Azzouni’s Assertoric-use QP is already included,  in 
nuce, in [RE]. What we argue is rather that [RE] is schematically general enough in order to provide an ar-
gument form that Azzouni’s Assertoric-use QP (which, as a matter of fact, has been offered beforehand and 
independently of [RE]) can be taken to instantiate via appropriate specifications.
54 [PE] or [PnE] can be seen as instances of a general way in which Quine would draw ontological 
conclusions. One might object that the minimal formulation would make nothing of the special subject 
matter  of  mathematics  (thanks  to  Matti  Eklund for  raising this).  However,  we don’t  find anything,  in 
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the remaining premises).
It is often thought that IA is especially suited for those mathematical (semantical or 
ontological) realists working in a broadly empiricist framework. As Shapiro claims, 
indispensability arguments are anathema to those, like the logicists, logical positivists, 
and neologicists, who maintain the traditional views that mathematics is absolutely 
necessary and/or analytic and/or knowable a priori55.
This is an obvious philosophical outcome for versions of IA that proceed under the 
assumption of naturalism and deliver necessary conditions for their conclusions 
(cf. the end of § 5.3). But this need not be so: when naturalism is left out of the 
picture, the argument only gives sufficient conditions for either semantic realism 
or platonism.
Clearly,  if  we espouse a naturalist ideology, we will  better make our argument for 
mathematical  (semantic  or  ontological)  realism  rely,  more  or  less  explicitly,  on 
naturalism, and thus secure (semantic or ontological) realism in a way that is consistent 
with our naturalist viewpoint. But it is not, as it were, in the very nature of IA to give 
sufficient  and necessary conditions for its conclusions. It  might just  be our particular 
interest to have a version of it giving both.
 IA is not a naturalist  argument  per se.  We see no ban in principle, for those who 
believe  in  the  a  priori character  of  mathematical  truths,  against  the  acceptance  of 
Quine's  reluctant  acceptance  of  platonism,  like  assuming something  special  about  mathematics  and 
building a form of IA on this (contrary to what is suggested by Steiner’s [1978, pp. 19-20] “transcendental” 
interpretation of IA). The special character of mathematics seems rather to be proved by the very fact that 
we cannot dispense with it in science. All posits are ontologically on a par until we are faced, as Quine 
would  call  it,  with  an  unabridged  language  of  science.  Not  all  posits  will  come  out  indispensable.  
Propositions and meanings don’t. Mathematics does. 
55 Shapiro [2005], pp. 13-14. Shapiro remarks is only cursorily made, and nothing special hinges on it in 
his discussion; we just take it as an indication of a widespread feeling.
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indispensability arguments56. Modest anti-naturalists of this sort57 will claim at most that 
IA is superfluous, or ancillary, since they can offer reasons for the same conclusion(s) 
that are by far more certain than the contingent grounds on which IA hinges. But this is 
definitely different from rejecting the argument.
The point is that the real anathema for all those philosophers listed by Shapiro in his  
quotation is not IA itself: it is naturalism.  Any argument relying on naturalism will be 
anathema for them: IA can, but need not, be a good candidate.
On this respect, it is remarkable that, after long time, Putnam himself recently felt the 
need  of  making  his  voice  heard  again  in  this  debate.  Commenting  on  Colyvan’s 
argument, Putnam clearly remarks that the ‘only’ direction of premise (i) of this argument
—the one committing a supporter of the argument to naturalism—expresses a thesis he 
“never subscribed to in [his] life”58. He stresses that his adoption of IA was meant to 
show—as already suggested in Putnam [1971] and [1975b]—that it is incoherent to adopt 
scientific  realism and  at  the  same  time  reject  (semantic)  realism about  mathematics. 
Moreover, he was explicit in claiming that
nevertheless,  there  was a common  premise in  my argument and Quine's [...]  That 
premise was “scientific realism”, by which I meant the rejection of operationalism and 
kindred forms of “instrumentalism”. I believed (and in a sense Quine also believed) 
that fundamental physical theories are intended to tell the truth about physical reality,  
and not merely to imply true observation sentences59.
At the very least, our conclusions can be seen as a way of setting the debate straight to 
its origin, and showing that the minimal versions of IA are more closely related 
than others to Putnam’s argument.
56 Some of Frege’s remarks [1893-1903, §91] have sometimes be taken as a statement of a form of IA in 
nuce  (but  see  Garavaso  [2005]  and  Sereni  [2013]).  But  it  would  be  utterly  implausible  to  claim that 
anything like IA was Frege’s main argument for believing in the existence of mathematical objects.
57 Radical anti-naturalists, like sceptics, would deny that science is any source of knowledge at all.
58 Cf. Putnam [2012, p. 183].
59 Ibid.  The  ‘in  a  sense’  qualification  concerns  Quinean  themes  (indeterminacy  of  translation, 
differences with a standard realist view of language) discussed in Putnam [1988]. They do not affect our 
present point.
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If IA is meant as delivering only  sufficient conditions for its conclusions, there is a 
clear sense in which it is being revisionary with respect to Quine’s original views.  In a 
number  of  different  passages  Quine  makes  controversial  claims  about  parts  of 
mathematics  (higher  set-theory,  for  example)  that  have  no  applications  in  empirical 
sciences, and are a fortiori not indispensable to scientific theories. Quine denies that the 
mathematical objects to which those parts of mathematics are committed to deserve any 
ontological rights (he famously spoke of “mathematical recreation”60). This attitude has 
engendered quite a wide debate61. If indispensability (in versions of IA for platonism) is, 
as it were, the mark of existence for mathematical objects, then the objects of unapplied 
mathematics are banned from our ontology. 
It is indeed possible to maintain a version of IA for which naturalism is necessary. This 
argument delivers the sort  of platonism that Quine endorsed.  But  this argument is  in 
tension  with  many  forms  of  platonism,  which  would  not  distinguish  among  the 
ontological  rights  of  different  parts  of  mathematics,  not  at  least  on  grounds  of 
applicability  and  indispensability  (Maddy  has  long  insisted  on  this;  see  e.g.  Maddy 
[2005]). It could even be argued that such an argument is not an argument for platonism 
(as  standardly conceived),  but  rather  for  the  proto-empirical  (or  “quasi-empirical”,  to 
borrow from Putnam [1975b, p. 62]62) character of mathematics.
Versions of IA giving only sufficient conditions leave open the possibility that we are 
justified in believing that unapplied mathematical theories are true, or that the objects 
they are about exist, wholly independently of IA: IA is understood as  an argument for 
60 Quine  [1986,  p.  400].  In  later  writings,  Quine  admitted  that  this  would  create  an  unjustifiable 
asymmetry between different parts of mathematics, hence he resorted to the idea that we cannot completely 
deny meaningfulness to unapplied parts of mathematics, but that we can arbitrarily decide whether to call 
those parts true or false (cf. Quine [1995, p. 56-57]).
61 Cf. Parsons [1983], Maddy [1992], Leng [2002; 2010], Colyvan [2007]. Putnam [1971], p. 346-7, 
suggests a view similar to Quine’s on unapplied mathematics. His is however a milder position (unapplied 
mathematics “should today be investigated in an ‘if-then’ spirit”), and he is wary of restricting his claims to  
“the case for ‘realism’ developed in the present section”. 
62 According to Putnam [1975b], mathematics could count as quasi-empirical in that we can account  
for it in terms of quasi-empirical methods of inquiries (other than deductive proof from axioms) based on  
successful applications. This is for Putnam consistent with a non-platonist interpretation of mathematics.
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mathematical (semantic or ontological) realism among others, not as the only argument.
If Quine suggests that a proper indispensability argument hinges on naturalism, then, it 
is only because he was a naturalist on independent grounds in the first place. Nothing in 
the argument mandates that this is so. That is just an example of the philosophical use of 
the argument (in a non-minimal version) that can be made in an empiricist framework. It 
is not a philosophical outcome that the argument can secure by itself.
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